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This paper presents different types of governance 
mechanisms that can be present in a specific value 
chain and explores how these can be used or need 
to be modified in view of intentions to reduce CHW. 
We primarily look at the way that the unobservable 
process-related quality attributes of a product are 
currently governed and discussed. We identify 
interactions/ coordination processes that we feel 
are relevant for ACHA and likely entrance points for 
interventions.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to operationalise the 
concept of agricultural value chain and value 
chain governance in order to identify entrance 
points for the Action on Children’s Harmful 
Work in African Agriculture (ACHA) programme. 
Interventions are intended social processes that 
aim to affect the lives of individuals and groups, 
and to enable and constrain their social strategies 
(Long and van der Ploeg 1989). Many of these 
interventions are implemented by the private 
sector actors that are involved in African value 
chains. The analytical framework presented in this 
paper, based on a rough typology of institutional 
arrangements as archetypical social sub-systems, 
helps to unpack some of the coordination and 
governance mechanisms that commonly exist 
between producers, traders, processors, retailers, 
consumers, and other intermediation agents in 
the agricultural sector. Unpacking this can help 
delimit the social systems in agriculture where 
entrance points for actions to address the issue of 
children’s harmful work (CHW) are most likely to 
be found or can be developed. We provide no fixed 
theoretical perspective to analyse the relations 
within these social systems (and their relations 
to higher-level social systems) but have limited 
ourselves to the description of the main elements 
of each social sub-system. Political economy, 
feminist, behavioural, technographic, institutional, 
emancipatory and other analytical perspectives are 
all needed in tandem to explore and understand 
the power and social relations within and between 
them, how they are connected and overlapping, and 
the room for change to support children’s wellbeing. 
1.1 Value chains
The term ‘value chains’ is used in the professional, 
developmental value chain development (VCD) 
literature (Bolwig et al. 2010; Donovan et al. 2015; 
Helmsing and Vellema 2011; Kaplinsky and Morris 
2001; M4P 2008; Mitchell, Keane and Coles 2009; 
Riisgaard et al. 2010; Roduner and Gerrits 2006) 
as a generic term to refer to agricultural sectors 
and includes production, trade, processing and 
distribution. In the academic, non-developmental 
literature, the concept of global or international 
value chains (GVCs) is more common. This GVC 
literature is especially interested in the governance 
of these supply chains (Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon 2005; Lee, Gereffi and Beauvais 2012) – 
that is, who exercises power in the value chain to 
influence the distribution of risks and rewards? GVC 
analyses are more common in the manufacturing 
sector (garments, cars, etc.) but less so in local 
smallholder-dominated agricultural value chains. 
Another school of academics prefer to use the term 
‘global production and distribution networks’ (Yeung 
and Coe 2015), which extends the analysis beyond 
vertical value chain linkages to consider also 
horizontal links across the sequence of production 
processes influenced by political, social and 
historical contexts. Recently, the term ‘food chain’ 
is becoming more en vogue (FAO 2014; Lentink 
2016), which covers production, distribution and 
consumption within the ‘food system’, with more 
emphasis on nutrition and health than earlier work 
on agricultural value chains had. Feyaerts, Van den 
Broeck and Maertens (2020) review the evidence 
on competition and spillover effects between global 
and local food value chains.
In this paper, we follow the more generic definition 
of value chain used in the developmental literature 
– agricultural sectors in which actors are linked in 
production, trade, processing and distribution, and 
coordinate issues related with the quantity, quality, 
and the terms of the transactions. We will analyse 
these value chains (our unit of analysis) with a 
focus on power relations and exclusion/inclusion 
dynamics. We consider value chains as nested 
systems of production and distribution that can 
be analysed at varying scales and levels, from the 
local, subnational and national to the global. A value 
chain has the vertical dimension of the flow of the 
product from upstream to downstream following 
the chain of intermediating actors. It also has the 
horizontal element of aggregation and coordination 
between similar value chain actors (farmers, traders, 
processors, etc.) at each link in the chain. Figure 1 
provides a taxonomy of stakeholders involved in 
the value chain; it differentiates between ‘chain 
actors’, who are involved in transactions, and ‘chain 
supporters’, who influence the room for manoeuvre 
of these chain actors in their transactions and 
sharing of risks and rewards, and who, in turn, are 
constrained by the socioeconomic and legal realities 
of the ‘chain context’. There are multiple ties, 
interdependencies and power relations between 
these different actors, which create emergence/
synergies, uncertainties/surprises and other system 
dynamics. The power relations can manifest as 
collaboration, collusion, conflict, competition, 
co-optation, capture or coercion (Ayele et al. 2016).
When we use the term ‘value chains’, we are 
placing a (porous) boundary around the system 
that we propose to analyse, through focusing on 
the power and power relations of these groups of 
actors, which is a feature in the GVC literature. This 
power is expressed not only directly (the buying 
company is imposing specific terms of trade on 
a product) but also indirectly (the ways in which 
these actors influence, shape and/or defend their 
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power by strategic use of the chain context, chain 
supporters, policies and related institutions). 
These power relations are sometimes entrenched 
in social norms that structure gender, race and/or 
other social relations in the value chain. Both these 
instrumental and structural forms of power and 
control (Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Arentsen 2009), 
being hidden or visible (Gaventa 2006), affect 
the distribution of risks and rewards between 
transacting parties.
The value chain is embedded in the local context 
where the chain actors are located, which may or 
may not overlap. In this research, we are primarily 
interested in the production areas and local 
markets, where children’s work is most relevant, but 
also in the context in which consumers make their 
decisions around food (for example, in urban areas 
in Africa or in the Northern importing countries). 
The latter is especially important for those value 
chains where certification schemes are relevant. 
The local social context in production areas includes 
other employment activities that emerge around 
agricultural value chains, such as in transport 
services, restaurants, building works, etc. As these 
non-agricultural sectors are often important to 
understand decision making in the agricultural value 
chain – for example, when these sectors influence 
prices, costs, negotiating power, etc. – they will 
be included as part of the value chain analysis. 
Of course, a value chain analysis needs to make 
decisions about the boundary of the social system 
and the level of detail that is useful and meaningful 
to include. This implies that the boundaries and 
elements chosen to be included or highlighted can 
always be contested by people with other analytical 
or normative lenses.
1.2 Value chain governance
To find entrance points for interventions to reduce 
children’s harmful work, we focus on the value 
chain governance dynamics – that is, on the 
quality of the communications, negotiations and 
transactions between different actors involved in 
agricultural production, both vertical (from farm to 
fork) and horizontally (between groups of similar 
actors such as farmer or trader associations, 
professional unions, service providers, etc.). These 
value chain governance dynamics determine the 
institutional arrangements around the value chain 
operations and the resulting distribution of risk and 
rewards between the actors involved. The nature 
and quality of value chain coordination is heavily 
influenced by the distribution of risks and rewards 
in these transactions (Handayati, Simatupang and 
Perdana 2015), as well as by the flow of knowledge 
and information in the chain. 
Figure 1. Schematic picture of the different actors involved in the value chain
Source: © Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR) (2010).
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Each value chain has a context-specific way in 
which stakeholders interact with each other. Our 
focus on power relations implies that we look at 
the rules and resources that underpin each actor’s 
capabilities, opportunities and motivations (see 
Figure 2).
Figure 2. Stakeholder behaviour at the micro and meso levels, conditioned by 
access to rules and resources
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1.3 Value chain governance 
mechanisms
We want to understand these value chain 
governance dynamics by identifying various 
‘typical’ social regularities (Figure 3). These 
types constitute different configurations of 
institutional arrangements and incentives that 
tend to have similar kinds of dynamics and 
coordination challenges. For some value chains, 
these ‘social regularities in dynamics’ are related 
to the transactions in the value chain; for others, 
they are associated with the type of institutional 
environment and service delivery in the value 
chain. In this paper, we call all of them ‘value 
chain governance mechanisms’. Each mechanism 
represents a particular type of interaction 
between agency and structure in the value chain 
(Giddens 1979). Value chain mechanisms are 
structuring properties: they constrain agency 
but at the same time can be modified by human 
agency. Many of these institutional arrangements 
and incentives that are captured by value chain 
governance mechanisms are a combination of 
(sometimes conflicting) formal and informal rules 
and regulations, but which tend to be more or 
less stable in time (social regularity). Especially in 
smallholder agriculture, informal, unwritten rules 
and regulations are critical in structuring market 
access and shaping livelihood strategies. 
We focus our attention on those links in the value 
chain where, under conditions of interdependency, 
smallholders, local agents, farmer groups and 
traders are exchanging agricultural products or 
related services, and are interacting about the 
quality attributes, risks and rewards in these 
transactions. We also focus on interactions 
characterised by having more than only the 
price as relevant information to decide on a 
transaction. We are particularly interested in the 
roles that agribusiness – both large multinational 
agribusinesses and small and medium-sized 
enterprises – plays in these arrangements. 
Understanding the role of agribusiness in value 
chain governance is critical because it provides 
a way to assess entry points for intervention. 
Moreover, under the United Nations (UN) Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
businesses have a duty to assess and address 
human rights abuses. Under national (and now also 
regional) human rights due diligence legislation, 
this duty is increasingly becoming a legal obligation 
for firms headquartered in the signatory countries 
(e.g. France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom).
2  A typology of value chain governance 
mechanisms 
In this paper, we present different types of value 
chain governance mechanisms, highlighting the 
most relevant institutional arrangements that 
characterise them. These differences provide 
different entrance points for research and action 
to address and mitigate the risks of hazardous 
work by children. The value chain governance 
mechanisms that we present in this paper are 
present across African agriculture, but some 
mechanisms may have more relevance in some 
contexts and cropping systems than in others. 
These mechanisms are present in very ‘traditional’ 
and very ‘modern’ value chains. For example, 
contract farming and certification mechanisms 
are also present in the informal patronage within 
villages, where poor farmers depend on ‘big men’ 
or ‘big women’ as a risk mitigation strategy to help 
them cope with health emergencies, which goes in 
the direction of becoming an (informal, unwritten) 
contract farming mechanism, and is not necessarily 
benign.
In this section, we set out a typology of six types of 
value chain governance mechanisms, and delineate 
sub-types for each, linking these sub-types with 
different potential entry points for interventions 
on CHW. We start the typology with a description 
of the spot market mechanism, characterised by 
‘price only’. In real-world value chains, ideal-typical 
spot market transactions are rare; there are almost 
always other mechanisms than price in transactions 
between value chain actors more upstream or 
downstream. We mention these according to 
increasing complexity. We start with spot markets 
and in-company coordination. Then we move to 
contract farming and collective marketing. We end 
with certification and multistakeholder platforms as 
the most complex but least common mechanism. 
While the typology reflects different types of value 
chain governance mechanisms, the dynamics in any 
single value chain may involve multiple governance 
mechanisms influencing how the chain functions, 
and vary at different links in the value chain. 
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2.1 Spot market mediation
Often, buyers and sellers of a product do not 
know each other, or the personal relationship is 
delinked from the way the price is defined. The 
main coordination mechanism is the price. We 
call this a spot market transaction. Often, spot 
markets involve a place (village market, commodity 
exchange, auction, etc.) where multiple sellers 
and multiple buyers are negotiating the terms of 
trade of agricultural commodities. Price plays a 
role in setting incentives and providing information 
related to quality, quantity and timing, as well as 
allocating risk. 
In these arrangements, buyers and sellers are 
relatively autonomous, as product specifications 
are simple, and products can be supplied with little 
direct input from buyers (Gereffi et al. 2005). Where 
these sellers and buyers are numerous, there is a 
higher likelihood that the price reflects real scarcity 
of the product, which is considered by most 
economists as the best price discovery mechanism, 
as competition is high and the cost of each party 
switching to new partners is low. However, where 
these markets are dominated by a few parties 
(e.g. traders), then information asymmetries or the 
ability of some parties to store stocks or to offer 
better services will enable them to extract rents 
and benefit disproportionately (Jayne et al. 2014). 
Government policies can affect these dynamics, 
through instruments such as competition policy, 
or government support for transport, information 
and market infrastructure (Vorley, Cotula and 
Chan 2012). These measures influence price 
transparency and market information, which affect 
farmers’ access to markets and influence power and 
competition in the market. 
Though farmers can sell directly to traders either at 
the farm gate or local markets and still have only the 
price as the relevant coordination mechanism, most 
spot market mediation takes place at rural market 
centres, where individual farmers come together 
to sell to competing traders. This overcomes the 
farmers’ problem of lack of competition while 
offering traders the chance to buy produce in 
bulk (Wiggins and Compton 2016). Despite the 
potential transitory nature of these relationships 
between buyer and seller in such markets, repeated 
transactions and longer-term relationships over 
time can generate trust and a type of market-
based value chain governance (for example, 
between farmer and trader). However, despite the 
development of this relationship, switching costs 
remain low, as suppliers use generic assets rather 
than investing in those specific to a particular 
transaction or buyer (Gereffi et al. 2005).
While entry points for addressing CHW in spot 
market arrangements are limited (for the reasons 
discussed below), this is nevertheless a relevant 
governance type, since it is the one which reaches 
most small-scale producers. These producers 
are not formally organised or trading with large 
companies in highly organised value chains, but 
rather operate in much more informal and trader-
driven arrangements, which are primarily influenced 
by overall market conditions.
The nature of the interaction between farmer and 
trader varies in relation to the type of product, 
frequency of interactions (e.g. yearly, weekly, 
daily) and location (such as open food markets, 
auctions, commodity exchanges, hedging contracts, 
etc.). Each of these instances with spot market 
mechanisms will have specific thresholds and 
processes – for example, minimum volumes or 
computerised financial management. Despite these 
contextual specificities, we identify two broad sub-
types, each with somewhat different implications 
for entry points to address CHW. 
2.1.1 Anonymous spot market 
transactions
The first sub-type involves true spot markets, 
including those mediated by commodity exchanges 
or marketing boards, in which trading is anonymous 
(van der Mheen-Sluijer 2010). Anonymity 
means that no long-term trading happens, 
and transactions in food products are solely 
defined by the price of the product. The relations 
between buyer and sellers are depersonalised 
and once purchased from producers, the source 
of the product becomes untraceable. The only 
coordination mechanism is the price. 
Price acts as a coordination mechanism because it 
influences the decisions that private actors (farmer, 
households, companies) make. These decisions 
affect quality and production levels, and they 
can also influence the drivers for or against child 
labour. For example, Ravetti (2020) shows that the 
evidence about the causal relation between prices 
and CHW is inconclusive. An important takeaway 
from this literature review is that under certain 
circumstances, income increases are associated 
with a risk of increased child labour. Child labour 
is driven not only by poverty but also by earning 
opportunities, supported by the finding that in 
some situations, child labour increases with income 
(ibid.).
Moreover, cocoa in Ghana is a special case because 
the price setting is, to a large extent, state-
controlled, with annual reference prices. Bargaining 
for higher cocoa purchase prices (as a percentage 
of the international price) takes place at the national 
level in the Ghana Cocoa Board, COCOBOD, 
not between farmers and traders (Vellema et al. 
2016). For most other crops, however, the price 
is negotiated at the farm level and influenced by 
price fluctuations due to market dynamics, without 
a yearly reference price. The discussion above 
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suggests that potential entry points for addressing 
CHW in spot markets would revolve around 
addressing structural factors that depress the prices 
flowing to farm households. Entry points could 
include the following.
• Measures that increase the bargaining power 
of farmers, such as increasing access to market 
information or access to a greater diversity 
of markets. Access to financial services could 
give farmers more room to store and wait for 
improved post-harvest prices.
• More resilient households are also likely to be 
more able to negotiate with traders. And this 
resilience could be improved with the provision/
improvement of basic services in these remote 
rural areas, including education, health and water 
(domestic and irrigation). Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) often work on these basic 
services and could provide entrance points for 
discussions about the drivers of CHW.
• The role of the chain context (Figure 1) is another 
entry point for ACHA-relevant interventions – for 
example, measures that reduce the bargaining 
power of buyers, such as stricter competition 
policy or floor prices for commodities. 
2.1.2 Spot market with repeated 
personal interactions
The second sub-type also involves market-
mediated exchanges in which price is the primary 
coordination mechanism, but repeat transaction 
and longer-term relationships between buyer 
and seller develop (Webster 1992), although 
without requiring explicit governance mechanisms 
such as contracts or other types of pre-harvest 
arrangements. These conditions make possible a 
degree of negotiation, cooperation and traceability 
with respect to CHW. They can support a learning 
process between buyer and seller, and a lower risk 
of opportunistic behaviour, at lower transaction 
costs than usual (Cadilhon et al. 2007; Goldbach, 
Seuring and Back 2003; Williamson 1975).
Potential entry points for addressing CHW in these 
other market-mediated exchanges would imply 
increasing prices to farm households, as described 
above. Also, this potential for traceability may 
provide an entry point for coordination around 
CHW issues through the following.
• Measures that reward producers via improved 
market access and higher prices (e.g. for 
providing them with products that are produced 
without using CHW). Regular transactions 
could result in traceability, and intermediaries 
(traders) could pay higher prices to farms which 
produce to these higher standards, and transit to 
certification-like governance. 
• Buyers that want to pay a fair price for products 
that have higher social qualities need to trust 
the quality delivered to them. The use of 
better labour standards during production 
does not result in different observable product 
characteristics. This unobservability makes it 
easier for transacting partners to ‘cheat’. Without 
an independent verification system, the reliability 
of traceability by personal reference only is low. 
This challenge is similar to the intermediation of 
organic products through agent-trader networks.
2.2 In-company governance
Business coordination intends to integrate 
activities to ensure that resources are used most 
efficiently to achieve a set goal in an organisation. 
The management should bring together different 
individuals, groups and ideas within the business. 
The management seeks to achieve coordination 
through its basic functions of planning, organising, 
staffing, directing and controlling for a common 
goal (Shinde 2018). That is why coordination is 
not a separate function of management because 
achieving harmony between individual efforts 
towards achievement of group goals is key to the 
success of business management. Coordination 
is the essence of management and is implicit 
and inherent in all functions of management. In-
company coordination requires transactions and 
coordination between different units of the same 
firm or holding, where the price is not negotiated 
like in a spot market. These different types refer to 
the relationship between the ownership of the firm 
and the management of the firm. This is relevant 
because although in theory management is there 
to achieve the goals of the company owners, in 
practice, management has its own set of incentives, 
which mean that behaviour and decisions may not 
always align with the goals/interests of owners. 
Thinking about entry points for research on drivers 
of child labour requires an understanding of the 
interests and incentives of owners and managers, of 
how these influence behaviours that are related to 
CHW, and how these incentives can be influenced. 
We present three sub-types.
2.2.1 In‑company governance in 
stock‑listed firms
Stock-listed firms have shares owned by 
individuals or institutions that are legally separated 
from the firm itself. Shareholders influence 
management by asking for transparency, mainly 
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in financial reporting, but, increasingly, in asking 
for a non-financial report covering broader 
environmental, socioeconomic and/or governance 
dimensions of business performance. These 
reporting requirements provide incentives for 
companies such as Unilever to develop corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) programmes where 
they piloted approaches to showcase their social 
commitment. CSR is the voluntary behaviour of 
companies to go beyond the legal requirements 
of the country in which they operate, given their 
long-term interests for integrating economic, social 
and environmental impacts to their operations 
(Jamali and Mirshak 2007). In time, the initially 
philanthropy-motivated CSR policies have been 
mainstreamed and translated in in-company 
requirements to monitor social conditions in 
production. The interests of shareholders are, 
however, primarily based on financial returns, and 
minority shareholders (for example, organised in 
hedge funds) can effectively pressure companies 
to focus on short-term strategies to maximise 
shareholder profits.
• Stock-listed firms have incentives to limit 
reputational damage. This makes them active 
stakeholders in the debate around children’s 
work. Their conceptions of child labour may be 
analysed and challenged in ACHA, and their 
search for workable interventions to address 
a perceived problem makes them attractive 
partners for collaborative, action-oriented 
research. 
• Although direct involvement of these firms in 
agricultural production is rare, several stock-
listed firms (such as those in tea, sugar or biofuel 
crops) do not only have estates or large farms 
that are active in direct production but are 
also involved in outgrower schemes (contract 
farming) or delegate production to certified 
preferred suppliers. Directly operated plantations 
are concentrated in the production of biofuel 
crops (sugar, oilseeds) or cereals (wheat, soy). 
In Africa, due to land tenure regulations, direct 
foreign investments in primary agricultural 
production are less evident than in Latin America 
but on the rise in some countries (e.g. land 
grabbing).
2.2.2 In‑company governance in 
family‑owned firms
The incentives of shareholders are markedly 
different in companies that are family-owned, which 
transfer the equity to future generations within the 
same family. They can have more long-term visions 
of growth. The lack of shareholders means that 
privately held companies are less subject to external 
pressure than listed companies. If they have values 
that mean they support social causes (or have 
brands to protect) they can take a long-term view. 
However, family-owned firms can also be more 
secretive and ruthless than listed companies in their 
operations. Many of the large African companies are 
family owned, often intertwined with the political 
system in place.
• Family-owned firms that source agricultural 
products may have distinctive brands to sell 
to consumers. Reputational damage to the 
brand’s image may affect sales and provides 
an incentive to discuss children’s hazardous 
work in primary production. However, their 
reporting requirements are less than public-listed 
companies, resulting in less transparency of 
operations. 
• Often, firms need a ‘licence to operate’ in the 
villages where they are active. Therefore, they 
might want to engage in activities that are 
motivated by social concerns (Ton, Vellema and 
Danse 2009), and develop CSR-like policies. 
These can be in the form of an inclusive business 
model, where these concerns influence their 
core economic processes and transactions, 
or in a way that does not affect their logistics 
and transactions in the value chain but has a 
philanthropic or political motivation.
• The close relations between large family-owned 
firms that are directly active in agriculture 
and the political system in a country can work 
twofold. On the one hand, these firms may be 
influenced by the national policy debate and be 
more proactive in implementing interventions. On 
the other hand, they are also in a better position 
to work reactively and hinder the implementation 
or effectiveness of interventions to improve 
sustainability and address CHW because these 
regulations threaten their economic interests.
2.2.3 In‑company governance in 
parastatal firms
The picture changes again when ownership of the 
company is not private but partly or entirely public. 
Especially when the parastatal firms function in 
the domestic market, the close link between state 
and business provides opportunities for these 
enterprises to influence public policies but also to 
be influenced by policies and politics. They are more 
likely to become part of public-private coordination 
processes. Public-led formal legislation abounds 
in all countries; most labour laws, children’s rights 
and human rights conventions have been ratified 
by African governments. Implementation of these 
policies may be easier when the government is also 
in control of the companies that need to conform 
to them. Marketing boards, like COCOCOB in 
Ghana, present a good example of these parastatal 
companies, where internal coordination and control 
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of the value chain is easier than in value chains 
where transactions are less regulated, and where 
the influence of political and ethical concerns is 
less important than economic rent. However, it is 
important to note that this is not straightforward. 
For example, COCOBOD often publicly denies the 
existence of CHW in spite of the formal Ghanaian 
government policies.
• The public ownership of a company makes 
it easier to discuss and translate national 
government policy priorities for the company’s 
business practices. The influence of trade unions 
is often more significant, and eventual negative 
media coverage may affect political careers. This 
creates a better context to discuss the social 
relations of production (labour rights, social 
benefits) and CHW issues.
2.3 Collective marketing
An important mechanism for smallholder farmers to 
gain bargaining power in transactions is collective 
marketing. Collective marketing implies coordination 
and communication about the quantity and quality 
of the product being sold (or purchased), and often 
implies a division of tasks and responsibilities in 
negotiations about these attributes with buyers. 
It is a governance mechanism for horizontal 
coordination. It is often used by small-scale farmers 
to compete more effectively in the market, and 
it may require additional storage, processing or 
packaging of the crop, with the costs shared by 
the collective. These associated costs of collective 
action often imply that the poorest farmers are 
excluded from these collective marketing models. 
Entering new markets for the first time is a 
significant challenge for many smallholder farmers 
in developing countries. It demands new skills 
and knowledge – for example, about standards 
and requirements, marketing channels and 
consumer tastes. Neven (2012) contends that 
cooperation among smallholders to serve these 
markets jointly requires: (1) a strong business 
rationale and relationships with the private 
sector, in terms of costs versus benefits, which 
should show that there is a profit in it; (2) that 
the demands placed on farmer groups do not 
exceed their current group management skills and 
financial capacities, suggesting that delegation 
to an audited management body may be needed; 
(3) the right internal cohesion and group dynamics 
(small size, homogeneity, face-to-face contact, 
accountability among members), which takes 
time; and (4) a supportive legal environment (legal 
status of the farmer organisation). Based on a 
series of case studies, Neven (2012) supported the 
assertion by Stringfellow et al. (1997) that farmer 
cooperation should not be viewed as a panacea 
for development. Groups have a role to play but 
do not provide an easy institutional response to 
the pressures facing smallholders in a liberalised 
economy.
Collective marketing groups include cooperative-
like economic farmer organisations as well as not-
for-profit associations and farmer-led commercial 
enterprises (Ton 2010). Farmer-led enterprises 
are formally registered companies with farmers as 
co-owners. Collective marketing groups are often 
involved in and created or supported by other 
governance mechanisms, such as contract farming 
arrangements, certification schemes and spot 
market mediation. We make a distinction in three 
(overlapping) sub-types that differ in the way that 
membership is defined, and the intensity of social 
interaction that it implies.
2.3.1 Small groups that develop 
value‑adding activities
Collective marketing of agricultural products often 
starts with sharing costs of storage or transport. 
Other groups are organised around processing or 
post-harvest value-adding activities and decide 
to sell their products collectively. Women’s groups 
may take up the milling of rice or maize and sell the 
flour or sell honey or marmalade. When groups are 
small, ownership of the product that is aggregated 
for the collective marketing remains individual 
(and traceable), and responsibility for the quality 
(e.g. humidity content for storage) may still be 
individual, but the price negotiation is collective. 
The added value (e.g. by processing, packaging 
or aggregation) results in better prices than when 
the farmer would have had to negotiate the price 
individually. In larger groups, generally, the product 
is transferred to the group, with associated risks 
related to ownership of a (perishable) crop. This 
requires stronger organisational capacities and 
creates the need for consultation and coordination. 
Often, this leads to a board with representatives 
of the members, and a specific legal form (be it 
cooperative, enterprise or association). Most of 
these groups ask only a small contribution from 
members, especially for travel costs, but do not 
retribute the time spent by the board in this work. 
Therefore, often, the better-off farmers are elected 
to these leadership positions. Sometimes it is hard 
to define whether a group’s governance is based on 
patronage or democratic deliberation.
• For ACHA, these groups may provide a channel 
of communication, especially when they are 
supported by NGOs that can function as a 
bridge. However, most of these groups are only 
active for a short period of time, around the 
harvest of the product that is being marketed, 
and they cease to function in the rest of the year.
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• The founding history of these cooperatives 
is important for their internal trust and 
organisational strength (Ton, Opeero and 
Vellema 2010); often they emerge from 
pre-existing, looser networks, such as fellow 
believers, choir groups or extension groups 
(farmer field groups).
• Because of their crop orientation, these groups 
are very knowledgeable about the exact work 
tasks associated with the specific crop or value 
chain. They will have an informed perception of 
hazard and children’s work that can inform the 
research. 
2.3.2 Larger multi‑purpose membership 
groups
Some farmer groups are engaged in economic 
activities for most of the year; we call these 
‘multi-purpose membership groups’. They often 
take the legal form of a cooperative, but can 
also be found in quasi-cooperatives or informal 
groups. Cooperative procurement of inputs such 
as seed and agrochemicals, hiring of vehicles and 
determining output price is well known among 
cassava (into gari and dough), fish (smoked), and 
meat (cuts) processors in southern Ghana. Due 
to the multiplicity of tasks, these groups have 
interpersonal interactions and transactions during 
most of the year, which makes them important 
forms of social capital in the region. They often 
market their products directly to traders, processors 
or retailers in urban areas, not in the local spot 
market or to local collectors. Because they tend 
to be larger, and membership relations less 
personalised, the opportunities for side-selling 
are inherent to the functioning of these groups. 
Transactions made on behalf of the group can 
collapse due to this. However, strong groups have 
found a way to contain these side-selling tensions 
in a way that the group functions are maintained/
reproduced (Ton 2010). These groups may offer 
entrance points for research and the development 
of interventions to address CHW.
• The economic farmer organisations that exist 
in a country are pivotal for many other value 
chain governance mechanisms discussed 
in this paper because they provide a clear 
communication channel. In various cases, 
multinational companies support the collective 
marketing dynamics of these more professional 
multi-purpose farmer organisations. For 
example, they are part of the efforts by chocolate 
and coffee companies to tackle child labour on 
farms (Nestlé Cocoa Plan and ICI 2017). They 
are prime recipients of information and training, 
and this capacity-building agenda addresses 
work issues that threaten to deprive children of 
education, health care and development (Tulane 
University 2015). 
• Even when multi-purpose membership groups 
are not directly involved in sourcing or producing 
a specific commodity, they can be partners for 
action around children’s hazardous work. The 
multi-purpose aspect of these groups makes it 
easier to include additional activities that are not 
directly related to their value chain role. 
2.3.3 All‑inclusive village groups
Family and clan ties bind communities together 
in many countries, and these ties give certain 
duties and rights to each group member. Such 
relations of trust and familiarity can form the basis 
of farmers’ marketing associations (Robbins et al. 
2004). Village groups tend to have an automatic 
membership based on geographical residence. Even 
though villages and communities differ considerably 
between regions and countries, they tend to include 
as members everyone that meets certain criteria, 
without the need to ask for membership or to 
pay a membership fee. These criteria may be (for 
instance) having land in the village, or being a family 
member, or being born in the area. Sometimes 
membership may be related to perceptions of a 
person’s good behaviour.
• Village groups are generally recognised 
as administrative units. They are therefore 
the logical entrance points for ACHA work 
in agricultural value chains that involve 
governmental partners or development NGOs.
• Because the village often includes households 
engaged in multiple activities rather than just 
one specific crop or sector, the leaders are not 
necessarily the most knowledgeable about the 
work and organisation of specific value chains 
(e.g. fisheries or high-value horticultural crops).
• Village authorities often have an important role 
in conflict mediation and will be informed about 
intra-household conflicts related to children’s 
work or abuse. Being arbiters or counsellors, 
they might be specifically knowledgeable about 
perceptions of what is fair, abusive or harmful. 
However, they may also be conservative and 
mainly concerned with protecting the status quo 
and objecting to changes in social norms. 
• In Ghana, in some communities, child protection 
committees already exist; these are voluntary 
structures with a specific mandate to raise 
awareness, identify and support children 
affected by abuse or harmful work. The Ghana 
Children’s Act 1998 established the legal basis 
around the creation, membership and functioning 
of such groups, and related child panels.
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2.4 Contract farming
Contract farming is a commercial relationship 
between a firm and a group of farmers. It is an 
agreement in which farm production is bought in 
advance by a firm in exchange for specific services 
and other benefits (Ton et al. 2018). Although 
principally a commercial initiative, contract farming 
may be considered as an institutional arrangement 
within an inclusive business partnership, as a 
way to overcome the challenges that smallholder 
farmers face when linking to remunerative markets 
or accessing inputs of services for agricultural 
production or post-harvest processing. During the 
past decade, there has been a rapid increase in 
studies that assess the effects of contract farming 
(Barrett et al. 2012; Meemken and Bellemare 
2019; Minot and Ronchi 2015; Otsuka, Nakano 
and Takahashi 2016; Oya 2012; Prowse 2012; Ton 
et al. 2018; Vroegindewey and Hodbod 2018). The 
contextual diversity of the contractual arrangements 
involved, however, make it difficult to draw 
generalisable conclusions about their effectiveness. 
The definition of contract farming differs between 
these studies. For example, Meemken and 
Bellemare (2019) include under the term ‘contract 
farming’ all pre-harvest sales contracts, while 
Ton et al. (2018) focus only on pre-harvest sales 
contracts with some sort of embedded service 
provisioning. They define contract farming as:
a contractual arrangement for a fixed term 
between a farmer and a firm, agreed verbally 
or in writing before production begins, that 
provides material or financial resources to the 
farmer and specifies one or more product or 
process requirements, for agricultural production 
on land owned or controlled by the farmer, which 
gives the firm legal title to (most of) the crop or 
livestock. (Ton et al. 2018: 48)
Several authors (Bijman 2008; FAO 2008; Jia and 
Bijman 2013; Prowse 2012) are more inclusive in 
their definition and make a distinction between 
market-specification contracts, production-
management contracts and resource-providing 
contracts. 
A market‑specification (or marketing) contract 
is a pre-harvest agreement between producers 
and contractors on the conditions governing 
the sale of the crop/animal. Besides time and 
location of sales, these conditions include the 
quality of the product, thus affecting a few 
of the production decisions of the farmer… 
The production‑management contract gives 
more control to the contractor than the market 
specification contract, as the contractor will 
inspect production processes and specify input 
usage… Under the resource‑providing contract, 
the contractor not only provides a market outlet 
for the product, but he also provides key inputs. 
(Bijman 2008: 5)
But even within these types of contract farming, the 
contexts differ markedly, because the crop differs, 
the quality attributes differ, type of service provided 
differs, or the package of services provided differs, 
as do the conditions under which these services 
are provided. The ‘adoption’ of contract farming is a 
complex system in which propositions, encounters 
and dispositions lead to responses (Glover et al. 
2019). Moreover, the response of contracting and 
re-contracting involves (self-selective subgroups 
of) the farmer, the farmer organisation and the 
contracting firm. Each of these subgroups has its 
specific constraints related with opportunities, 
capabilities and motivation for behaviour – COM-B 
(Michie et al. 2011), and these are partly the result 
of the particularities of the contract attributes 
proposed (Abebe et al. 2013; Bellemare and Lim 
2018; Sartorius and Kirsten 2007). 
The systematic review of contract farming by Ton 
et al. (2018) identifies three other entrance points 
for sub-types of contract farming arrangements 
– especially given the coordination modalities 
involved. One dimension (criterion of difference) is 
the possibility (or not) to refrain from re-contracting 
(‘room to opt out’). In most value chains related to 
annual production, this is possible. In horticultural 
production, the choice of a crop and a market is 
often defined based on pre-harvest agreements 
with future buyers (e.g. intermediary traders), 
although the exact price is often defined at the 
moment of sales. However, in contract farming in 
irrigated sugarcane or tea (Wendimu, Henningsen 
and Gibbon 2016), for example, this opting out is 
often impossible because of the location of the plot 
(in a larger area, grouped with other smallholder 
farmers) or because the investments made are 
considered as credit and need many years to be 
paid off. Outgrowers, who deliver to a central 
processing unit, can be ‘locked in’ by indebtedness 
or irrigation, land tenure regulations or resettlement 
schemes. Another crucial difference is the 
involvement (or not) of one or more farmer groups 
that mediate between the contracting firm and the 
individual farmer. Particularly when the contract 
farming is done at scale, with many farmers under 
contract, there is a need for coordination through 
representatives via some sort of farmer group. 
Many new contract farming ventures learn to adapt 
to the context and develop ways to use existing 
social capital (groups with high internal cohesion 
or trust) and customary legal institutions to reduce 
the chances of opportunistic behaviour (Ton and 
van der Mheen-Sluijer 2009). The third dimension 
relates to the product being perennial or annual 
agriculture or derived from animal husbandry 
(particularly intensive meat production systems).
For ACHA, we think that the following two 
sub-types are the most relevant because they 
provide different entrance points to discuss issues 
related to children’s work.
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2.4.1 Informal resource‑providing 
agreements
When the price is not the only coordination 
mechanism, but additional services and 
expectations play a role, a transaction will move 
towards a ‘pre-harvest agreement’. This relationship 
is common in cash-crop production, where the 
buyer may give cash in advance of the harvest to 
pay seasonal workers to pick the crop or provide 
packaging material. Often, the buyer of cash crops 
prefers certain varieties and provides seeds in 
advance, sometimes on subsidised terms or credit. 
In the African savannah area, tractor services are 
commonly used to prepare fields for planting. 
Sometimes this service is also part of a ‘package’ 
of services that make trust and risk-sharing 
additional attributes of a potential pre-harvest sales 
transaction and considered by the farmer in his or 
her decision making.
These interpersonal relations can be heavily power-
laden, sometimes forced upon the farmer due to 
indebtedness. Often, the person with whom the 
farmer has the agreement plays an essential role in 
the social network needed for households to cope 
with shocks. For example, relations of patronage 
can force farmers to sell to the ‘big men/women’ in 
the village, or to the (future) family-in-law to resolve 
the bride price or similar obligations.
These dense interpersonal relations and (mutual) 
dependencies have implications for how CHW can 
be addressed, as follows. 
• Even more than the repeated interactions in 
spot markets, these informal resource-providing 
agreements make it possible to ‘trace’ the 
product to upstream producing households. In 
principle, this allows downstream communication 
about the (un)desirability of certain types of 
labour and the withholding of the offer of the 
resource-providing agreement by the buyer. 
• The ‘big men/women’ are key nodes in the social 
network in the village and, even when they have 
an exploitative role in economic transactions, 
they might have the moral authority that can be 
mobilised to reach the households that are in his/
her ‘web’ with information.
• The provisioning of child labour can be an 
essential component of this patronage or 
bondage that farmer households face. Use of the 
interpersonal relations to market products of a 
poor farmer’s plot might become, in exceptional 
cases, a driver of the provisioning of child labour 
– for example, to help during harvest time on the 
big men or women’s plot; patronage can thus 
lead to forms of modern slavery.
2.4.2 Formal resource‑providing contracts
This type of contract farming is increasing, 
principally because the urban population is growing 
fast. Moreover, the urban food market is the 
majority food market because urban areas have 
higher incomes than rural areas (Reardon et al. 
2019; Tschirley et al. 2015). In Africa, processed 
foods have penetrated both rural and urban 
markets. In Tschirley et al.’s (2015) study, 56 per 
cent of urban households’ and 29 per cent of rural 
households’ food expenditures (in value terms) 
went to processed foods. 
Processing firms tend to prefer purchasing 
agricultural products with a more uniform quality 
than is usual in rural and urban open food markets. 
Often, they prefer more stable prices for their inputs 
to better plan processing and marketing of the 
processed products to consumers. This gives them 
an incentive to find preferred suppliers and to look 
for ways to shorten the chain of intermediation. 
Often, supermarkets or processors tend to work 
with the medium/large producer, even when they 
start initially with smallholders as suppliers (Dolan 
and Humphrey 2000). When they work with 
smallholders at scale, this almost always includes 
the combination of two governance mechanisms: 
contract farming and collective marketing by 
organised farmer groups (Ton et al. 2010).
Processing firms face more public scrutiny than 
informal village-based agents. They also tend to have 
more influence on local and national governments. 
Both aspects mean they provide different entrance 
points for interventions on CHW, as follows.
• The formal, written agreements codify the mutual 
rights and obligations and reflect the underlying 
power relationship. To prevent negative publicity, 
and to comply with the demands of international 
buyers and get an export licence, in Kenya the 
horticultural sector – through the Horticultural 
Crops Development Authority (HCDA) – invested 
in the development of a ‘model contract’ that 
clearly specified the risks and rewards, and 
conflict resolution mechanisms in the contractual 
relationship. A company is required by the 1995 
export order to use formal contracts and to 
adhere to certain practices that are presented as 
contract terms by the HCDA Code of Conduct 
(Waarts and Meijerink 2010).
• Often, processing firms manage a ‘brand’ in their 
country and may be susceptible to negative 
media coverage by consumers or retailers 
deprioritising purchases in response to this. 
Though child labour – rightly or wrongly – is still 
far less prominent in consumers’ minds, it could 
be an entrance point for action. ACHA research 
could inform this debate and prevent 
unintended negative effects of well-intended 
media coverage.
16 ACHA Working Paper 6
2.5 Certification schemes
Certification is the formal attestation or 
confirmation of certain characteristics of an 
object, person or organisation, often provided 
by some form of external review, assessment or 
audit. Accreditation is a specific organisation’s 
process of certification. Certification programmes 
emerged in the 1980s in response to consumer 
demands for sustainability and fairness. They 
were developed in the context of a willingness 
to pay for sustainably produced food items. The 
first certification programmes concerned organic 
production, especially in Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Later, in the 1990s, fair trade emerged in response 
to calls for greater fairness in value chain relations 
between smallholder producers in developing 
countries. At the same time, the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) was launched to protect forests 
and regulate the timber trade, and the Rainforest 
Alliance developed a certification scheme aimed 
to reduce biodiversity loss. In Europe, the retail 
sector started operating certification schemes 
around food safety and good agricultural practices, 
which resulted in EurepGAP and later GlobalGAP. 
Many companies have specific standards, which 
are often modifications of international standards 
tuned to their requirements. Despite this diversity, 
certification schemes have some common 
characteristics – not least as a result of the global 
platform the ISEAL Alliance, which represents 
those voluntary standards that comply with certain 
credibility requirements. 
Certification schemes are mainly focused on 
tropical export crops, especially banana, cocoa, 
coffee, sugar and palm oil. In some sectors, the 
share of certified production is rapidly increasing. 
A significant proportion of the total output of 
cocoa produced in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire is 
currently under one or more certification schemes 
– according to 2016 data, 35 per cent and 
44 per cent respectively (ISEAL Alliance 2019). 
Certification schemes for tropical commodity 
exports of perennial crops (e.g. Rainforest Alliance, 
Fairtrade) are covered by more process-related 
product quality attributes, while organic (e.g. Soil 
Association, Skal in the Netherlands, etc.) or 
good agricultural practices (e.g. GlobalGAP, many 
in-company schemes) are more important in 
annual production, where control is more geared 
to measurable product quality attributes, especially 
of pesticides. The European Food Law Regulation 
gave an immense impulse to certifications because 
it made distributing companies and retailers legally 
responsible for the products they sell and required a 
system of traceability to be in place. 
One of the most relevant pilot interventions that 
emerged in the certification community – though 
not restricted to certification systems – are Child 
Labour Monitoring and Remediation Systems 
(CLMRS). These multistakeholder, area-based 
approaches are seen as one of the more promising 
interventions to address the issue of hazardous 
child labour (International Cocoa Initiative 2011; 
International Labour Organization (ILO) 2018). 
Remediation activities are at the heart of the efforts 
of CLMRS and are directed to different drivers: 
access to education, health services, awareness of 
laws, etc. Remediation is about supporting children, 
their families and communities to remove children 
from a situation of risk. The purpose is twofold: 
to try and prevent children from doing hazardous 
work in the first place, and to help children who 
are engaged in hazardous work to stop doing so. 
The majority of remediation activities to date have 
focused on education, activities to improve family 
income, and assistance with farm-related work 
(Nestlé Cocoa Plan 2019). The requirement to have 
a CLMRS (or similar system to assess and address) 
is a fairly recent one for the Rainforest Alliance/
UTZ, limited to certain contexts, and still not a 
requirement for Fairtrade certified coops.
The incidence of organic and GAP certification is 
more dominant in contract farming that involves 
medium/large producers, and far less in smallholder 
production. ISEAL Alliance’s accredited certification 
systems tend to be managed internationally in 
OECD countries and use third-party verification 
to control that the requirements are met. There 
are, however, some certification systems without 
third-party verification, but with participatory 
processes of social control. They have a system 
that certifies that the producer or farm household 
uses certain practices (e.g. organic or low-input 
agriculture). These so-called participatory 
guarantee systems are still small and primarily 
piloted at scale in Latin America, with limited 
experiences in African agriculture (Cannon, Thorpe 
and Emili 2019).
The main distinction in types of certification is 
related to direct certification of production on 
an estate/plot, and group certification where the 
control is indirectly through an internal control 
system (ICS).
2.5.1 Smallholder group certification
Almost by definition, smallholder production is 
organised through group certification. The ICS 
that needs to be in place can be managed by a 
private firm (e.g. a trader or processor) or by a 
farmer group. Most certification schemes have 
different auditing modalities and critical control 
points that take this distinction into account 
(Ton, van der Mheen-Sluijer and Castillo 2012). 
In smallholder production, the audit will primarily 
look at the credibility of the ICS (the way that 
internal control is organised and registered). The 
ICS required for smallholder certification opens 
a window for ACHA to work on an improved 
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and contextualised definition of CHW. The 
auditors apply a list of control points, where some 
questions/control points are related to children’s 
work. These lists may differ between certification 
programmes and have changed over time. ACHA 
could help ISEAL Alliance members to develop 
procedures and requirements that are appropriate 
and commensurate with smallholder livelihood 
strategies. This could be through supporting the 
design of risk-based monitoring procedures that 
respect the heterogeneity of context and aspirations 
among smallholders. Some other entrance points 
are as follows.
• The control points in the audit were, at first, 
based on ILO definitions of child work and 
child labour, and followed an ‘abolitionist 
approach’ (van Daalen and Hanson 2019). 
However, this has led to unintended effects 
for and opportunistic behaviour of farmers and 
auditors. Instead of helping to address the issue 
of hazardous child work, it inhibited a view 
of daily reality in production areas. Therefore, 
instead of checking compliance and using the 
de-certification threat, many standard systems 
and leading processors changed their approach 
and now emphasise the need for monitoring and 
remediation. 
• Child Labour Monitoring and Remediation 
Systems (CLMRS) use local systems of social 
control and vigilance. Sometimes a social worker, 
paid by the buying company, is responsible for 
visiting these households and finding out what 
happened. The local facilitators are well-suited 
to document illustrative cases – for example, 
because children are not attending school or 
are registered in the health post or hospital with 
work-related injuries. They raise awareness in 
these households about the tasks that children 
of that age are considered to be able to do or not 
do. 
• These CLMRS provide promising sites for ACHA 
research, both because they collect large data 
on household livelihoods (for example, the 
International Cocoa Initiative estimates that it 
collects panel data on 150,000 households) and 
because they represent cases of interventions 
for the evaluation of impact of value chain 
intervention related to CHW.
2.5.2 Medium/large producer 
certification
While for smallholder farmers a large part of the 
ICS for certification requirements is decentralised, 
with an external auditor checking the credibility 
and administration of this ICS, for medium/large 
producers there is a stronger focus on core criteria, 
directly monitored by the third-party verification 
body. Auditors consider, among other issues, social 
issues related to workers and families that live 
on-site, as well as certain environmental topics 
(Rainforest Alliance 2018). Instead of smallholders, 
rural workers become the central focus. Because 
medium and large producers have high or complete 
control of the land and the production process, 
the power of the firm to comply rigidly with 
the requirements of the certification body is far 
greater than in smallholder group certification, 
and therefore the external scrutiny of their social 
practices is stronger. This also implies a more direct 
influence of the ILO and its abolitionist approach, 
with their associated intended and unintended 
effects. The threat of effective de-certification 
based on child labour-related criteria in these 
medium/larger producer certification schemes is 
higher than in smallholder schemes.
• The abolitionist approach is questioned by 
ACHA (Sumberg and Sabates-Wheeler 2020). 
This higher prominence of the ILO definitions in 
the certification requirements for medium/large 
producers, and the more vulnerable position of 
workers compared to (diversified) smallholders, 
provides a logical entrance point for ACHA 
work. ACHA can help to ‘change the narrative’ 
on CHW versus child labour, with ISEAL as the 
logical platform to do so.
• The CLMRS might also be relevant interventions 
in these sectors, monitoring the situation in 
households that live near or on these plantations. 
The data and networks which are inherent to 
these CLMRS may be used in ACHA research.
• The monitoring at landscape level also implies 
that this type of certification links ACHA to other 
audiences than the ‘rural’, such as the worker 
unions in a country. Organisations that cross 
urban and rural settings will need to balance the 
appropriateness of certification requirements for 
each. It is not straightforward that governments, 
worker unions and certification schemes can find 
workable regulations that are so highly context-
specific that they prevent all unintended negative 
effects on household livelihood strategies.
2.5.3 Landscape‑level certification
Value chain actors operate in large social systems. 
Particularly when ecological outcomes are key, 
certification schemes need to work with other 
stakeholders, not only the direct certified farms or 
farmers. Moreover, the value chain supporters (see 
Figure 1) are influenced by many other factors than 
the certification scheme. Therefore, the discussion 
on certification and sustainable development has 
moved gradually to ‘Beyond certification’ and 
systemic effects (Ruben 2019; Termeer et al. 2019). 
CLMRS are an example of this trend. Increasingly, 
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certification schemes look for landscape-level 
effects and jurisdictional approaches that involve 
not only the direct producers of the product that 
is being certified but also the wider village or 
region. International climate funds may trigger 
the emergence of these more ‘systemic’ forms 
of certification – for example, by requiring forest 
management plans that involve other users, or 
irrigation and water management plans that involve 
or need consent from upstream and downstream 
users. This provides different entrance points to 
work on CHW, as follows. 
• The wider social system that is considered in 
these landscape-level approaches makes it 
conducive to multi-stakeholder processes. This 
implies that, next to value chain actors, interest 
groups and government agencies such as those 
related to health and education, biodiversity 
conversation and water management may 
participate in discussions and governance 
around the required social attributes of a product 
or crop.
• The enhanced scope in landscape-level 
certification requires behavioural incentives 
for stakeholders (including farmers and other 
habitants of that landscape) that create change 
at scale; small pilots do not suffice. This may 
shift the audience of ACHA research from the 
(predominantly) Northern headquarters of 
certification schemes and industry partners to 
the change-makers in these countries, including 
local and national governments.
2.6 Multi-stakeholder 
partnerships
Multi-stakeholder partnerships or multi-stakeholder 
platforms (both terms are used, abbreviated 
as MSP) are institutionalised but voluntary 
collaborations between multiple private, public and/
or civil society stakeholders that seek sustainable 
solutions to complex and systemic challenges, 
which the participants believe cannot be achieved 
by acting alone. Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), 
multi-stakeholder global action networks (GANs), 
(agribusiness) policy networks, or social impact 
networks are other formulations. First popularised 
at the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002, MSPs exist 
in sectors ranging from water and energy to health, 
food and agriculture. 
Drawing from examples relevant to the agri-food 
sector, MSPs can be defined as:
a process of interactive learning, empowerment 
and participatory governance that enables 
stakeholders with interconnected problems and 
ambitions, but often differing interests, to be 
collectively innovative and resilient when faced 
with the emerging risks, crises and opportunities 
of a complex and changing environment. 
(Brouwer et al. 2016: 14)
MSPs have also been defined as:
any collaborative arrangement among 
stakeholders from two or more different spheres 
of society (public sector, private sector and/or 
civil society), pooling their resources together, 
sharing risks and responsibilities in order to 
solve a common issue, to handle a conflict, to 
elaborate a shared vision, to realise a common 
objective, to manage a common resource and/or 
to ensure the protection, production or delivery 
of an outcome of collective and/or public interest. 
(HLPE 2018: 15)
MSPs respond to governance failings that result 
in collective action problems (Olson 1965), 
especially in complex and multi-level contexts, in 
which conflicting short-term interests discourage 
cooperation that could leave all participants 
better off in the long term. They are a form of 
networked governance (Jessop 2000; Rhodes 
1997, Thorpe et al. forthcoming) which involves 
dialogue, collaboration, and the experience of 
working together to build trust and mutual respect 
between otherwise often antagonistic stakeholders, 
promoting problem-solving (rather than bargaining 
based on interests) as the key decision-making 
style (Bache 2008). Outcomes cannot be explained 
exclusively based on individual actor power and 
interests, but require understanding these dynamics 
and how they result in a power balance in which 
members all see themselves as benefiting, although 
without suggesting that this balance is in any way 
‘equal’ (Bache 2008; Rhodes 2006). 
In general terms, MSPs are intended to achieve 
transformational change through convening 
multiple stakeholders and facilitating exchange 
between them, fostering an enabling environment 
for collaboration, and stimulating new investments, 
innovations, policies and activities aligned with 
intended change; with successes identified 
and scaled. Existing studies have tended to 
classify MSPs based on either the structure and 
arrangements of the MSP or the domain or purpose 
of MSP activities. 
Sub-type classifications of the structure 
and arrangements of an MSP often focus on 
geography or scale of operation (local, national, 
regional, global). While categories are seemingly 
straightforward, difficulties arise where the same 
MSP operates at multiple scales or geographies 
(HLPE 2018; Treichel et al. 2017). Others focus on 
the size or problem scope of the MSP. Some MSPs, 
for example, involve only a handful of partners 
directly engaged in addressing defined problems 
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in a set period. At the other extreme, MSPs involve 
many and multiple stakeholders, including many 
that are involved only through representation 
(e.g. in global roundtables), dealing with systemic 
problems over the long term (Beisheim and 
Simon 2016; Hazlewood 2015). However, these 
different scopes represent more of a spectrum 
than a clear set of sub-types. Other studies focus 
on the composition of the MSP, based on the 
characteristics of its members, particularly which 
sector of society they come from (public, private or 
civil society) (HLPE 2018).
Sub-types based on domain or purpose may focus 
on MSP genesis; in other words, the history and 
reasons behind the creation of the MSP, and how it 
emerged. They may also focus on the MSP target 
groups or the group(s) within society who are 
intended to benefit from activities. However, the 
most common and relevant sub-typology is based 
on the intervention or activity that is the primary 
function of the MSP (Beisheim and Simon 2016; 
Buckup 2012; HLPE 2018; Muoio and Rimland 
Flower 2016; Treichel et al. 2017; Witte, Benner 
and Streck 2005). By focusing on the primary 
purpose of the MSP, rather than its structure and 
arrangements, we are able to generate analytical 
sub-types based on groups of activities and then 
make inferences relating these activities to entry 
points for addressing CHW. In addition, they may 
all have a temporal variable representing MSP 
evolution over time. This temporal variable could 
be framed in terms of stages in MSP evolution: 
initiation, implementation and impact (Brouwer 
et al. 2016; Rockefeller Foundation 2017). 
We suggest three sub-types. Although they are 
not mutually exclusive, and there are likely to be 
elements of knowledge transfer, agreeing standards 
and action across most MSPs, they are delineated 
based on their primary activities and objectives. 
2.6.1 Industry norm and standard‑
setting MSPs
Industry norm and standard-setting MSPs are 
primarily designed to develop, strengthen and 
enforce global or national norms and standards in 
a particular industry, sector or crop (Beisheim and 
Simon 2016; Buckup 2012). They are generally 
voluntary industry-based efforts, developed in 
response to perceived public sector failures to 
promote appropriate social and/or environmental 
practices. Typically, industry leaders and/or civil 
society dominate. The public sector is often either 
absent or present in a secondary role (Fransen and 
Kolk 2007). As a result, questions of legitimacy 
(who participates in governance), accountability 
(who is accountable to whom) and power are 
frequent critiques (Witte et al. 2005).
There is considerable variation among these MSPs 
in terms of how formalised they are and how strong 
their verification and compliance procedures are 
(Beisheim and Simon 2016; Buckup 2012). At 
one end of the spectrum, there may be no formal 
commitment while at the other end, formalised 
standards and certification processes enforce 
obligations. There are parallels and overlaps of 
this sub-type with certification schemes, since 
both have a focus on setting common production 
standards. However, not all of these MSPs involve 
certification and labelling. With the certification 
schemes discussed before, they are included in the 
wider group of voluntary standard systems. The 
large and more renowned ones have ISEAL as their 
global discussion platform. 
The food and agriculture sectors have examples of 
industry norm and standard-setting MSPs. Some 
of these MSPs are using product certification as a 
value chain governance mechanism. But even those 
tend to have a far broader portfolio of activities to 
improve sustainability in the sector. They include 
the International Cocoa Initiative, the Forest 
Stewardship Council, the Marine Stewardship 
Council, the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil, 
the Roundtable for Responsible Soy, Bonsucro, 
the World Banana Forum, the Global Roundtable 
for Sustainable Beef, the Better Cotton Initiative, 
the World Cocoa Foundation, the Ethical Trading 
Initiative, the Global Coffee Platform, and 4C. 
Considerations for interventions that work on the 
issue of CHW include the following.
• Lead firms in value chains are key participants 
in these MSPs. Through lead firm power and 
influence, MSPs are also able to reach and 
enforce standards among intermediaries and 
farmers that supply the lead firms. Through this 
same pathway, requirements related to CHW 
could be introduced. 
• With notable exceptions (e.g. the Ethical Trading 
Initiative), these MSPs have tended to be crop-
specific and to focus only on high-value crops 
sold through global value chains, including palm 
oil, soy, sugar, cocoa, coffee and horticulture. 
That said, these MSPs can engage with chain 
supporters (e.g. government extension providers 
or other information providers) to also work for 
domestic markets for these same crops.
• Specific entry points may include:
  adding specific principles, commitments 
and/or reporting requirements on CHW, or 
identifying areas relevant to CHW within 
existing standards and principles
  training and awareness for members and 
certifiers on CHW
20 ACHA Working Paper 6
  raising awareness among industry actors 
regarding the degree to which standards 
address or mitigate the risk of CHW, to raise 
demand for products that do meet necessary 
standards
  involving civil society groups or 
representatives of working children in the 
membership and governance of these MSPs.
2.6.2 Action and service‑oriented MSPs
Action and service-oriented MSPs are primarily 
designed to deliver goods and services or 
implement policies, programmes and projects 
(HLPE 2018) towards a defined goal such as 
transforming the agricultural sector or making 
specific food market crops more efficient, resilient 
and profitable. While they may be involved to 
some degree in standard-setting, knowledge 
co-generation and capacity building, they are more 
directly outcomes- and impact-focused (Buckup 
2012). MSP membership is typically based on 
actors’ interests and ability to contribute resources 
towards the overarching MSP goal (Witte et al. 
2005), and may include governments, the private 
sector, donors, UN agencies and farmers’ groups, 
among others.
Action and service-oriented MSPs emphasise 
facilitating joint action, innovation and pooling 
of resources (Buckup 2012) to deliver ‘positive 
externalities’ that are undersupplied when the 
market is left to operate on its own, while improving 
the allocation of scarce resources to avoid 
duplication of efforts (Witte et al. 2005). These 
positive externalities may include policy change, 
better natural resource management, value chain 
development, innovation, resource mobilisation, or 
some combination thereof (HLPE 2018; Muoio and 
Rimland Flower 2016; Pattberg and Widerberg 
2014; Witte et al. 2005). 
These action and service-oriented MSPs are 
common in the food and agriculture sector. 
Examples include: Grow Africa, the global Food 
Security Cluster, the Global Agenda for Sustainable 
Livestock, Kudumbashree, the German Initiative 
on Sustainable Cocoa, the New Alliance for Food 
Security and Nutrition, Malawi Tea 2020, and 
the Farm to Market Alliance. Considerations for 
interventions that work on the issue of CHW 
include the following.
• Action and service-oriented MSPs tend to focus 
on particular social or environmental issues 
(which may include CHW), geographies or value 
chains (for example, cocoa).
• Unlike most industry norm and standard-setting 
MSPs, they often cover both high-value export 
crops and domestic food staples. 
• Although there are global MSPs in this group, 
implementation is often tied to particular 
geographies (national and sub-national). For 
example, although the Farm to Market Alliance 
is a global initiative, implementation takes place 
through specific value chains at country level.
• They are intended to work by bringing together 
different value chain or sector stakeholders 
to define the necessary behavioural changes, 
capacities and resources to achieve the goal, 
along with a joint action plan. 
• Specific entry points may include:
  providing technical know-how and support 
– for example, on measures to address and 
mitigate risk related to CHW, or on improving 
value chain productivity and competitiveness 
(as a means to enable higher adult wages)
  providing financial support or access to 
finance for investment and innovation
  facilitating knowledge exchange between 
stakeholders (for example, on already tested 
innovations)
  supporting pilot projects (for example, by risk 
sharing).
2.6.3 MSPs for knowledge sharing and 
learning
MSPs for knowledge sharing and learning tend 
to start from the perspective that solutions to 
challenges already exist, but a lack of knowledge 
and information sharing means that these solutions 
are not replicated, and scale is not reached 
(Loveridge and Wilson 2017). The focus, therefore, 
is on raising awareness of known problems 
and potential solutions via convenings, reports, 
conferences and digital media. They may also 
involve an element of building trust and respect 
between participants from different stakeholder 
groups.
In some cases, knowledge sharing and learning 
MSPs also focus on knowledge co-generation and 
capacity building (HLPE 2018), by bringing together 
different stakeholders with relevant information 
and experiences, which can offer more effective 
and inclusive solutions than relying on ‘technical 
experts’ alone. This is seen to be especially 
important in the context of complexity, where 
transdisciplinary and participatory approaches are 
important to develop viable solutions (ibid.) . 
Food and agriculture sector examples of MSPs 
for knowledge sharing and learning include: the 
Pan-Africa Bean Research Alliance (PABRA), the 
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African Orphan Crops Consortium (AOCC), the 
Southern Africa Food Lab (SAFL), and the Voice 
for Change Partnership (V4CP) Programme. 
Considerations for interventions that work on the 
issue of CHW include the following.
• This type of MSP could create opportunities for 
enabling the voices of typically marginalised 
stakeholders (poor households, children, children 
with disabilities) to be heard and respected. 
• Another opportunity would be to introduce 
knowledge and solutions related to CHW within 
existing knowledge-sharing MSPs in agriculture 
(for example, in the SAFL).
• Alternatively, there is potential for regional and 
local MSPs, grouping various local stakeholders, 
directed explicitly towards knowledge exchange 
with regards to CHW in their area and value 
chain, which may also be focused on a particular 
region or crop. The MSP would provide a 
decentralised platform, complementing the 
global roundtables, and facilitate dialogue and 
knowledge-sharing to develop or disseminate 
solutions.
3 What’s next?
This paper has explored the different types of 
governance mechanisms that can be present in a 
specific value chain, and how these can be utilised 
or modified in view of intentions to reduce CHW. 
We primarily looked at how the unobservable 
process-related quality attributes of a product 
Figure 4. Value chain governance mechanisms according to the number of 
stakeholders involved and degree of institutional complexity
Source: Authors’ own, inspired by Bitzer et al. (2011).
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are being governed and discussed. We identified 
interactions/coordination processes that we feel 
are relevant for ACHA and likely entrance points 
for interventions (which we can evaluate at a 
later stage). We do not claim that our typology is 
sufficiently comprehensive or analytically robust, 
but it may help to illustrate that entrance points 
for value chain interventions can be identified, 
dynamics assessed and impacts evaluated 
according to different governance arrangements. 
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of 
the location of these value chain governance 
mechanisms on two dimensions: the number 
of stakeholders involved and the degree of 
institutional complexity. It is also clear that many 
of these governance mechanisms overlap and 
may be present alongside each other in different 
positions in the value chain (and related production 
and distribution networks). In the Annexe, we 
present some examples of real-world cases from 
Ghana that illustrate the configurations of different 
mechanisms. In any agricultural sector, there will 
be several of these configurations that compete in 
the same markets. For example, there can be spot 
market governance in transactions between farmers 
and traders, but contract farming arrangements 
with these traders and the processing plant. And 
the processing plant can integrate several steps in 
the value chain and use in-company governance 
mechanisms to guide the terms of the transactions 
between sub-units. Most sectors have different 
configurations of governance mechanisms: 
for example, in onion production, there can be 
both an integrated firm, a collective marketing 
experience and a firm that does contract farming. 
Heterogeneity is evident everywhere.
The value chain governance mechanisms indicate 
where existing discussions and decision making 
around quality, risks and rewards take place, and 
where CHW issues are (or can be) discussed. This 
provides entrance points to analyse and discuss 
the narratives, parameters and indicators that are 
being used. Each configuration, and its competition 
or collaboration with other configurations, provides 
a different ‘arena’ in which ACHA research can be 
situated.
Figure 5 summarises the different entrance points 
for ACHA research identified in this paper. It 
presents them on two axes that are similar but 
slightly different. The vertical axis indicates the 
need for different types of coordination. Vertical 
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coordination takes place between chain actors 
that are working at different levels in the value 
chains, from farm (upstream) to fork (downstream). 
Horizontal coordination takes place between chain 
actors at the same link in the chain. The horizontal 
axis indicates the scope and scale of the change 
process involved. It differentiates actions and social 
change that are closer to the farmer household 
(micro level) versus those that require coordination 
at a larger scale (the macro level). The colours in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show which entrance points 
are linked to which type of value chain governance 
mechanism. The figure shows that there are many 
governance spaces where value chain interventions 
do and can take place and where CHW may be one 
motivating factor.
A note of caution: these are only archetypical 
representations, and the reality ‘on the ground’ 
will show that these entrance points are not 
set in stone, just as the value chain governance 
mechanisms may be more hybrid and 
configurational in real life than as presented above 
(see Annexe for some examples). 
These value chain governance mechanisms can 
be used to assess the prevalence of what is 
considered to be children’s hazardous work. In more 
institutional complex governance mechanisms, 
some information about the quantity and quality 
of the product and the production systems may be 
aggregated and synthesised. For example, a great 
deal of data is collected through the CLMRS and 
the audit of certification systems (see Roelen et al. 
2020). This data, stored somewhere among the 
stakeholders involved in each mechanism, may help 
to reflect on the ‘real’ prevalence of CHW.
However, the typology that we present is specially 
designed to set the stage for analytical research to 
detect the drivers of CHW, especially the economic 
drivers and the nature and distribution of power 
in transactions; we think that the typology helps 
to understand and anticipate the coordination 
that is needed within value chains to address 
the issue of CHW, as well as provide entrance 
points for strategies to influence these dynamics 
towards positive outcomes. We also hope that 
the paper illustrates some of the interventions 
that are taking place in value chains, particularly 
where CHW is one of the motivations for doing so. 
These interventions are often well-intended but 
not always well-designed, well-implemented or 
effective. And they often have unintended effects 
that are overlooked or undervalued. ACHA has 
the ambition to help the implementers of such 
interventions to reflect on the assumptions that 
guide their work and give them practical tools 
to refine their intervention strategies (or change 
course altogether). We argue that scanning for 
specific value chain governance mechanisms is 
a good way for ACHA to find new interventions 
(‘actions’) that help to upgrade the quality of 
governance in value chains in ways that help to 
reduce CHW in agriculture. 
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Annexe: Examples of value chain 
governance mechanisms in action in 
Ghana
All empirical situations will exhibit a specific 
governance system combining different governance 
mechanisms.
Figure A1. Example 1 – Yayra Glover
COLLECTIVE MARKETING
In the Eastern region, 
Yayra Glover company 
(a private exporter of 
cocoa beans) has for 
over two decades, 
organised the farmers 
and directly supplied 
them with inputs and 
technical information 
to produce high-quality 
cocoa bean for the 
Swiss market.
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Figure A2. Example 2 – Bonsucro
Figure A3. Example 3 – COCOBOD
The Ghana Cocoa Board, 
established in the 1950s, uses six 
subsidiaries to coordinate supply-
chain arrangements:
1 The Cocoa Research Institute of 
Ghana (SRIG) provides new seed 
varieties.
2 The Seed Unit (SU) deals with 
multiplication and sale of seeds. 
3 The Cocoa Health and Extension 
Division (CHED) explains new 
technological protocols and best 
practices.
4 The Cocoa Marketing Board 
uses licensed buying companies 
to purchase cocoa beans from 
farmers. 
5 The Quality Control Division 
(QCD) inspects the beans before 
shipment abroad or to in-country 
processors. 
6 The Cocoa Processing Company 
uses coco beans to manufacture 
chocolate products. 


















































Bonsucro is a global multi-stakeholder platform that exists to promote sustainable 
sugarcane production, processing and trade around the world. Bonsucro’s vision is a 
sugarcane sector with thriving, sustainable producer communities and resilient, assured 
supply chains. It has been operating as a global standards organisation since 2011, with 
growth reaching more than 400 members in 32 countries by 2015, more than 50 mills 
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